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The aim of the paper is to analyze the impact of heterogeneous beliefs in an otherwise
standard competitive complete market economy. The construction of a consensus probability
belief, as well as a consensus consumer, are shown to be valid modulo an aggregation bias, which
takes the form of a discount factor. In classical cases, the consensus probability belief is a risk
tolerance weighted average of the individual beliefs, and the discount factor is proportional to
beliefs dispersion. This discount factor makes the heterogeneous beliefs setting fundamentally
di⁄erent from the homogeneous beliefs setting, and it is consistent with the interpretation of
beliefs heterogeneity as a source of risk.
We then use our construction to rewrite in a simple way the equilibrium characteristics
(market price of risk, risk premium, risk-free rate) in a heterogeneous beliefs framework and
to analyze the impact of beliefs heterogeneity. Finally, we show that it is possible to construct
speci￿c parametrizations of the heterogeneous beliefs model that lead to globally higher risk
premia and lower risk-free rates.
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21. Introduction
The representative agent approach introduced by Negishi (1960) and developed by Rubinstein
(1974), Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), Constantinides (1982) has become a signi￿cant corner-
stone of theoretical and applied macroeconomics and has been the basis for many developments
in ￿nance. Among these developments, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM, Sharpe 1964
and Lintner 1965) and the Consumption based CAPM (CCAPM, Ingersoll, 1987, Huang and
Litzenberger, 1988, Du¢ e, 1996) play an important role. Given their empirical tractability,
these models have generated extensive empirical tests and subsequent theoretical extensions.
However, as mentioned by Williams (1977), ￿ di¢ culties remain, signi￿cant among which is the
restrictive assumption of homogeneous expectations￿ . It has been since repeatedly argued that
the diversity of investors forecasts is an important part of any proper understanding of the
workings of asset markets1.
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the consequences of the introduction of hetero-
geneous subjective beliefs in an otherwise standard Arrow-Debreu equilibrium economy. More
precisely, we start from a given equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs in an otherwise standard
complete market model and, as in Calvet et al. (2002) in a static setting, we investigate the
following issues: 1) Is it possible to de￿ne a consensus belief, i.e. a belief which, if held by
all individuals, would generate the same equilibrium prices and trade volumes as in the actual
heterogeneous economy? 2) Is it still possible in such a context to de￿ne a representative agent
(or consensus consumer)? 3) What is the impact of beliefs heterogeneity on the risk premium
(or market price of risk)? 4) What is the impact of beliefs heterogeneity on the risk-free rate?
5) What is the impact of beliefs heterogeneity on the assets price?
In this paper, we take the di⁄erent subjective beliefs as given. As in Varian (1985, 1989),
Abel (1989) or Harris-Raviv (1993), they re￿ ect di⁄erence of opinion among the agents rather
1See e.g. Lintner (1969), Rubinstein (1975, 1976), Gonedes (1976), Miller (1977), Williams (1977), Jarrow
(1980), Mayshar (1981, 1983), Cragg-Malkiel (1982), Varian (1985, 1989), Abel (1989), Harris-Raviv (1993),
Detemple-Murthy (1994), Basak (2000), Gallmeyer (2000), Welch (2000), Ziegler (2000), Gallmeyer-Holli￿eld
(2002), Calvet et al. (2002), Diether et al. (2002).
3than di⁄erence of information; indeed, ￿we assume that investors receive common information,
but di⁄er in the way they interpret this information￿(Harris-Raviv, 1993). The di⁄erent sub-
jective beliefs might come from a Bayesian updating of the investors predictive distribution
over the uncertain returns on risky securities as in e.g. Williams (1977), Detemple-Murthy
(1994), Zapatero (1998), Gallmeyer (2000), Basak (2000), Gallmeyer-Holli￿eld (2002), but we
do not make such an assumption. Notice that the above mentioned models with learning are
not ￿ more endogeneous￿since the investor updating rule and the corresponding probabilities
can be determined separately from his/her optimization problem (see e.g. Genotte, 1986).
The paper is organized as follows. We present in Section 2 a method to aggregate in an in-
tertemporal framework heterogeneous individual subjective beliefs into a single consensus belief.
Given an observed equilibrium with heterogeneous probabilities, we look for a consensus belief,
which, if held by all investors would lead to an equivalent equilibrium, in the sense that it would
leave invariant trading volumes and equilibrium market prices. The aim of this construction is
to analyze whether from the econometrician point of view and without access to microdata (i.e.
data on individual behaviors) there is a way to distinguish between homogeneous beliefs and
heterogeneous beliefs equilibria.
We start by proving the existence of a consensus characteristic. However, this characteristic
fails to be a proper belief in the sense that its density is not a martingale (or, in other words, does
not satisfy the law of iterated expectations) and, as a result, it can not be directly interpreted
as a change of probability. In fact, it is possible to decompose this consensus characteristic into
a proper consensus belief (a true probability belief) and a discount factor. We ￿nd then that
equilibrium prices and trading volumes in a heterogeneous beliefs economy are the same as in
an equivalent homogeneous beliefs economy in which agents would share the same consensus
probability belief, which is an average of the individual beliefs, but would discount their utility
from future consumption. As a consequence of the presence of this discount e⁄ect, the hetero-
geneous beliefs setting cannot in general be simply reduced to an homogeneous beliefs setting,
with an average belief.
4It is then easy to construct a consensus consumer who, when endowed with the total wealth
in the economy, generates the same equilibrium prices as in the original equilibrium. The belief
of this representative agent is the previously found consensus probability belief, his/her utility
function is the same as in the standard setting, but the representative agent has in general
a di⁄erent discount factor than the representative consumer that can be constructed in the
usual case of common beliefs. For example, when all agents have the same discount factor, the
consensus consumer typically has a di⁄erent (non constant) discount factor.
This discount factor is (at least in the classical HARA utility functions setting) proportional
to beliefs dispersion and might be positive or negative depending on whether the investor is
"cautious" or not. A possible interpretation of this discount consists in considering the dispersion
of beliefs as a source of risk. Indeed, when there is more risk involved, depending on whether the
investor is "cautious" or not, he/she will reduce or increase current consumption with respect
to future consumption (precautionary savings), acting as if his/her utility was discounted by a
negative or positive discount rate. In the heterogeneous beliefs framework, investors act as if
they were in an homogeneous beliefs setting with an additional source of risk and this e⁄ect is
captured, in the aggregation procedure, by the time-varying discount factor.
Concerning the consensus probability belief, it appears as a weighted average of the original
individual probability beliefs, and the weights are given, at least in the HARA setting, by the
individual risk tolerances. More risk tolerant agents see their beliefs better represented in the
consensus belief. This is a natural result. Indeed, if an agent is fully insured by other agents, it
is intuitive that this agent￿ s belief should not a⁄ect the equilibrium prices. Only those who bear
a share of the risk should see their expectations be taken into account at the aggregate level.
When the utility functions are logarithmic, the consensus probability belief is a wealth-
weighted average of the individual beliefs as ￿rst found by Rubinstein (1976). Notice however
that in this case the discount factor turns to be a constant, equal to one, which makes the
logarithmic utility functions case very speci￿c.
We give credit to Calvet et al. (2002) for the idea of constructing a representative agent in
5the heterogeneous beliefs setting modulo the introduction of some degree of freedom and their
paper actually is the starting point of our work. However our construction is very di⁄erent and
so is the rest of our analysis. Our degree of freedom is given by the introduction of a discount
factor instead of an adjustment of aggregate wealth as in Calvet et al. (2002)2.
In Section 3, we analyze the impact of beliefs heterogeneity on the market price of risk,
the risk-free rate and asset prices. For this purpose we consider a continuous-time framework,
where risk is generated by a Brownian motion. We adopt this framework in order to compare
our results with the standard ones obtained, among others, by Merton (1973), Breeden and
Litzenberger (1978), Breeden (1979) and Du¢ e and Zame (1989). The choice of It￿ processes
makes it possible to focus on situations with a ￿nite number of sources of risk and hence a ￿nite
number of possible sources of disagreement (note that, in an It￿ processes framework, all agents
necessarily agree on the assets volatility). For the sake of simplicity, all results are presented in
a one-dimensional Brownian motion setting but, as underlined in footnote 26, they can be easily
generalized to a multi-dimensional setting.
We derive an adjusted CCAPM formula. We prove that only the change of probability (from
the initial one to the consensus one) has an impact on the market price of risk. We ￿nd that
the CCAPM formula with heterogeneous beliefs is given by the CCAPM formula in an economy
where all investors would share the same probability belief namely the probability consensus
belief obtained through the aggregation procedure. The impact of heterogeneous beliefs on the
market price of risk is then very clear: it leads to an increase (resp. decrease) of the market
price of risk (with respect to the homogeneous setting) if and only if the consensus probability
is pessimistic (resp. optimistic), where pessimistic is meant in the sense that the instantaneous
aggregate wealth growth rate (under this probability) is lower that under the objective initial
2Note that Calvet et al. results are in a static setting and that the extension of their results to a dynamic
setting requires the introduction of a rescaling time varying stochastic (predictable) process and not only a scalar
adjustment. A discount factor seems more natural, from an economic point of view, than a rescaling of the
aggregate endowment. In our approach, utility functions are aggregated into a representative utility function,
beliefs are aggregated into a representative belief and time discount factors are aggregated into a representative
time discount factor. Besides, the aggregation procedure of Calvet et al. and its generalization to a dynamic
setting do not permit to disentangle the construction of the consensus probability and of the rescaling process
and leads to risk-premium and risk-free rate formulas that are hard to interpret.
6probability. In fact, the equity premium subjectively expected is the same for pessimistic and
optimistic agents and the reason why pessimism increases the objective expectation of the equity
premium is not that a pessimistic representative agent requires a higher risk premium. He/She
requires the same equity premium but his/her pessimism leads him/her to underestimate the
average rate of return of equity (leaving unchanged his/her estimation of the risk-free rate). Thus
the objective expectation of the equilibrium premium is greater than the representative agent￿ s
subjective expectation, hence is greater than the standard equity premium. Our results are
consistent with those of Abel (2002), Cechetti et al. (2000), Hansen et al. (1999), or Anderson
et al. (2000), which introduce distorded beliefs associated to cautious/pessimistic individual
behavior, but the main di⁄erence lies in the fact that in our framework, optimism/pessimism is
relevant at the aggregate level and not at the individual one. In particular, it is possible to have
optimism/pessimism at the aggregate level, even in models where the average (equal-weighted)
belief is neutral (neither optimistic, nor pessimistic).
By contrast with the market price of risk, both the change of probability and the discount
factor have an impact on the risk-free rate. The impact of the change of probability contributes
to a lowering of the risk free rate if and only if the consensus probability is pessimistic. Indeed,
if the representative agent is pessimistic about the growth rate of aggregate wealth, then relative
to the standard case, he/she will attempt to reduce current consumption and increase current
savings. The attempt to increase current savings puts then downward pressure on the interest
rate. Besides, the impact of the discount factor contributes to an increase (resp. decrease) of
the risk free rate when the ￿ discount rate￿is nonnegative (resp. nonpositive), which has a clear
interpretation: a nonnegative ￿ discount rate￿means that future consumption is less important
for the representative agent, and leads to a higher equilibrium interest rate. For linear risk
tolerance utility functions and for small beliefs dispersion, the ￿rst e⁄ect is quantitatively much
more important than the second one.
Section 4 explores this further by giving explicit formulas and numerical results in the case of
exponential or power utilities. In particular, we show that a positive correlation between wealth
7and optimism would induce an optimistic bias and a lower expected risk premium. Even though
short sale contraints are not part of our model, under the positive correlation hypothesis we
obtain that prices re￿ ect the more optimistic view, as in e.g. Miller (1977). This would imply
that assets with a higher beliefs dispersion should yield lower returns which is consistent with
the ￿ndings of Diether et al. (2002), who ￿provide evidence that stocks with higher dispersion in
analysts earnings forecasts earn lower future returns than otherwise similar stocks￿ . Conversely
a negative correlation between wealth and optimism would induce a pessimistic bias and a higher
risk premium. Moreover, we show numerically, that if investors are on average pessimistic the
risk premium is higher and the risk-free rate is lower than in the standard setting, which is
interesting in light of the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles (Mehra-Prescott, 1985,
and Weil, 1989).
Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Consensus belief, consensus consumer
In the classical representative agent approach, all investors are taken as having the same sub-
jective beliefs and the same opportunity sets. In this section, we analyze to what extent this
approach can be extended to heterogeneous subjective beliefs. More precisely, we start from a
given equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs in an otherwise standard complete market model,
and we explore to what extent it is possible 1) to de￿ne a consensus belief, i.e. a belief, which, if
held by all individuals would generate the same equilibrium prices and trading volumes as in the
actual heterogeneous economy and 2) to de￿ne a representative agent (or a consensus consumer).
The starting point of our aggregation procedure is the paper by Calvet et al. (2002).
The model is standard, except that we allow the agents to have distinct subjective probabil-
ities. We ￿x a ￿nite time horizon T on which we are going to treat our problem. We consider
a probability space (￿;F;P) and a ￿ltration (Ft)t2[0;T] on (￿;F) with FT = F which satis-
￿es the usual conditions3. As usual, the interval [0;T] is endowed with the Lebesgue measure
3i.e. (Ft)t2[0;T] is right-continuous and F0 contains all the P￿negligible events in F:
8￿ and we denote by P ￿ ￿ the product probability induced on the product space ￿ ￿ [0;T]:
Each investor indexed by i = 1;￿￿￿ ;N solves a standard dynamic utility maximization prob-
lem. He/She has a current income at date t denoted by e￿
i
t and a von Neumann-Morgenstern
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t2[0;T] the positive density process of Qi with respect to P, then the utility function can
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We make the following classical assumptions.
Assumption
￿ ui : [0;T] ￿ [ki;1) ! R [ f￿1g is of class4 C1;1; increasing and strictly concave with
respect to the second variable5,
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= 1 for i = 1;￿￿￿ ;N and some B > 0:
The ￿rst condition is a classical regularity condition. If we interpret ki as a minimum
subsistence level, the second condition can be interpreted as a survival condition for each agent6















4A function u(t;c) is said to be of class C1;k if it is continuously di⁄erentiable with respect to t and k times
continuously di⁄erentiable with respect to c:
5Note that we could easily generalize all the following results to the case where ki is a function of t:
















which permits, through trade, to reach allocations
￿
y￿i￿
> ki P ￿ ￿ a.s.
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such that 1
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9We do not specify the utility functions ui, although we shall focus on the classical cases of
linear risk tolerance utility functions (which include logarithmic, power as well as exponential
utility functions).
As underlined in the introduction, we take the di⁄erent subjective probabilities as given.
They might re￿ ect di⁄erence of opinion among the agents. They might also come from a
Bayesian updating of the investors predictive distribution over the uncertain returns on risky
securities. Note that this does not necessarily lead to the same posterior for all agents as in
Aumann (1976) because the agents might have di⁄erent priors that are not necessarily based on
information. They might also update their beliefs in a non Bayesian way, as in e.g. Scheinkman-
Xiong (2003) where some agents are overcon￿dent.
In the remainder of the paper, an admissible consumption plan for agent i is an adapted









< 1. We recall that an Arrow-Debreu8
equilibrium relative to the beliefs
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Mi￿




is de￿ned by a positive














































: Such an equilibrium, when it exists, can be characterized by the ￿rst order nec-
essary conditions for individual optimality and the market clearing condition. These conditions
8We recall that Arrow-Debreu equilibria can be implemented, by continuous trading, in Radner equilibria
with only a ￿nite number of securities (see Du¢ e-Huang, 1985).
10can be written as follows
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for some set of positive Lagrange multipliers ￿ = (￿i)i=1;￿￿￿;N :
In the sequel, we will say that (q￿;(y￿
i
)) is an interior equilibrium relative to the beliefs
￿
Mi￿






> ki; P ￿ ￿ a.s. for i = 1;￿￿￿ ;N.
Our ￿rst aim is to ￿nd an ￿ equivalent equilibrium￿in which the heterogeneous subjective
beliefs would be aggregated into a common characteristic M: Following the approach of Calvet
et al. (2002), we shall de￿ne an ￿ equivalent equilibrium￿ by two requirements. First, the







price process q￿ as in the original equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs. Second, every investor
should be indi⁄erent at the margin between investing one additional unit of income in the original
equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs and in the ￿ equivalent equilibrium￿ , so that each asset
gets the same marginal valuation by each investor (in terms of his/her marginal utility) in both
equilibria10.
The existence of such an ￿ equivalent equilibrium￿is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider an interior equilibrium (q￿;(y￿
i








. There exists a unique positive and adapted process (Mt)t2[0;T] with





i=1 ￿ ei = e￿ and a unique




is an equilibrium relative to
the common characteristic M and the income processes
￿
￿ ei￿
and such that trading volumes and
9Note that under the following additional condition u0
i(t;ki) = 1 for t 2 [0;T] and i = 1;￿￿￿ ;N; all the
equilibria are interior ones.
10This requirement is in fact equivalent to the condition that each investor￿ s observed (or initial) demand be
larger than (resp. equal to, less than) his/her demand in the ￿equivalent equilibrium￿ if and only if he/she
attaches a subjective probability that is larger than (resp. equal to, less than) the aggregate common probability,
which appears as a natural requirement for an aggregation procedure.
















is an equilibrium with income transfers relative to the common




such that individual marginal valuation is
the same as in the original equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs. In other words, we proved
that the initial equilibrium price process and trading volumes are also equilibrium price process
and trading volumes in an homogeneous beliefs setting with the same aggregate wealth (but a
possible di⁄erent allocation of this wealth across agents). The positive process M can then be
interpreted as a consensus characteristic. In particular, if there is no heterogeneity, i.e. if all
investors have the same belief represented by Mi = ~ M for all i, we obtain M = ~ M, ￿ ei = e￿
i
and
￿ yi = y￿
i
for all i.
The individual marginal valuation invariance property is in fact equivalent to the invariance
of the Lagrange multipliers. The cost we paid in order to maintain the Lagrange multipliers
invariant has been to authorize a modi￿cation of individual incomes. Since our second aim
is to construct a representative agent that would represent the economy, this is not really a
cost. Indeed, from the representative agent point of view only aggregate characteristics are
meaningful and "￿ctitious" feasible income transfers between agents (i.e.
PN





in the construction of the "equivalent equilibrium" might be authorized. In other words, we
characterize equilibria that are compatible with at least a feasible distribution of the total
wealth among agents.
It is now easy to construct as in the standard case, a representative agent, i.e. an expected
utility maximizing aggregate investor, representing the economy in equilibrium.
12For a given equilibrium (q￿;(y￿
i
)) relative to the beliefs
￿
Mi￿
; we introduce the function







where (￿) is the set of Lagrange multipliers provided by Equation (2.1).
Proposition 2. Consider an interior equilibrium (q￿;(y￿
i








: There exists a consensus investor de￿ned by the normalized von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u￿ and the consensus characteristic M of Proposition




under the market budget constraint EP
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0 q￿




The construction of the representative agent is exactly the same as in the standard setting. As
a consequence, all classical properties of the representative agent utility function remain valid in
our setting (see e.g. Huang-Litzenberger, 1988). Among other properties, if all individual utility
functions are state independent, then the aggregate utility function is also state independent11,








i (t;x) = ￿i+￿x; where all derivatives are with respect to x, then the aggregate utility function
is also such that ￿
u
0(t;x)
u00(t;x) = ￿ ￿ + ￿x where ￿ ￿ =
PN
i=1 ￿i:
Example 2.1. 1. If the individual utility functions are of exponential type, more precisely
if u
0
i(t;x) = aie￿￿ite￿x=￿i, then u
0
￿(t;x) = ae￿￿ ￿te￿x=￿ ￿ for a = ee
￿











2. If the individual utility functions are of power type, more precisely if u0
i(t;x) = bie￿￿t (￿i + ￿x)
￿ 1
￿
11Remark that our aggregation procedure applies to a framework where agents have common beliefs but possibly
di⁄erent state dependent utility functions of the following ￿separable￿form Ui (t;!;x) = vi (t;!)ui (t;x): In that
case, we obtain a representative agent utility function of the same form U (t;!;x) = v (t;!)u(t;x), where u is
obtained from the ui￿ s as in the standard framework, and where v is an average of the vi￿ s (note that even if the
vi￿ s are not martingales, our results still apply).
13for ￿ 6= 0; then u0
￿(t;x) = be￿￿t(￿ ￿ + ￿x)
￿ 1




























The consensus characteristic M is a martingale (i.e. the density process of a given probabil-
ity) only when ￿ = 1 (logarithmic case). It is a supermartingale when ￿ < 1, and a submartingale
when ￿ > 1:
Notice that it is not possible (except in the exponential case) to construct M and to obtain
q￿ as functions of the aggregate characteristics (e.g. consumption) of the economy and not of
the individual ones.
However, as we shall see in the next section, the formulation12 q￿
t = Mtu0
￿(t;e￿
t) which is a
direct consequence of Proposition 2, will enable us to compare equilibrium under heterogeneous
beliefs with equilibrium in the standard setting.
It is interesting to notice in Example 2:1 that for all utility functions in the classical class of
linear risk tolerance utility functions, the consensus characteristic is obtained as a risk tolerance
weighted average of the individual subjective beliefs13. Intuitively, the collective attitude towards
risk depends upon how risk is allocated among individuals. For example, if an agent is fully
insured by other agents, it is intuitive that this agent￿ s beliefs should not a⁄ect the equilibrium
12by construction, the representative agent￿ s Lagrange multiplier is normalized to 1.
13It is easy to see that in the general case, the consensus characteristic can still be considered as an average of































It is clear then that we cannot have Mt > Mi















t with a positive probability which contradicts the equations above.
The case Mt > Mi
t is treated symmetrically.
14price. Only those who bear a share of the risk should see their expectations be taken into account
at the aggregate level.
The process M represents a consensus characteristic; however, as seen above, except in the
logarithmic case, it fails to be a martingale. Consequently, it cannot be interpreted as a proper
belief, i.e. the density process of a given probability measure. It is easy to see that it is not
possible in general to recover the consensus characteristic as a martingale, as soon as we want the
equilibrium price to remain the same and the optimal allocations in the equivalent equilibrium
to be feasible, in the sense that they still add up to e￿ (even if we do not impose the invariance
of individual marginal valuation)14.
This means that in the general case, there is a bias induced by the aggregation of the
individual probabilities into a consensus probability. We shall see in the following propositions
that the utility function of the representative agent is not an expectation of the future utility
from consumption but an expectation of a discounted future utility from consumption. The
(possibly negative) discount rate will be on average nonnegative (resp. zero, resp. nonpositive)
when M is a supermartingale (resp. martingale, resp. submartingale).
In order to further specify our model, let us assume that (Ft)t2[0;T] is the P￿augmentation
of the natural ￿ltration generated by a one-dimensional Brownian motion W on (￿;F;P), and
that e￿ and Mi; i = 1;￿￿￿ ;N; are positive It￿ processes that satisfy the following stochastic
di⁄erential representation
de￿
t = ￿ ￿(t)dt + ￿ ￿(t)dWt; ￿ > 0;
dMi
t = ￿ ￿
i(t)dWt; Mi
0 = 1:




i (t;x) = 1: Let us consider the ￿equivalent
interior equilibrium￿ allocations (￿ yi
t) associated to the same equilibrium price q￿ as in the initial equilibrium
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and M is a martingale only if all the Mi￿ s are equal.
15where ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿
i, for i = 1;￿￿￿ ;N are (Ft)t2[0;T]￿adapted stochastic processes15 such that
Z
j￿ ￿(t)jdt < 1;
Z
￿ ￿




(t)dt < 1; for i = 1;￿￿￿ ;N.
Let us denote by ￿, ￿ and ￿







If we further assume that the utility functions are of class C1;3; the ￿rst order conditions for



















dMt = ￿M(t)Mtdt + ￿
M(t)MtdWt
All the coe¢ cients are (Ft)t2[0;T]￿adapted stochastic processes. In the next, we will assume
that ￿












Proposition 3. Consider an interior equilibrium price process q￿ relative to the beliefs (Mi);
and the income processes (e￿
i
): There exists a positive martingale process ￿ M with ￿ M0 = 1; and























The process B measures the default of martingality of the consensus characteristic M and
15There is no Markovian assumption; ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿
i; for i = 1;￿￿￿ ;N may depend on the entire past history of
the economy.
16This condition ensures that
R
￿MdW is a martingale. For linear risk tolerance utility functions, it is easy to


















. The adjustment process B measures then the aggregation bias induced by the
heterogeneity of individual beliefs.
There are mainly two cases where there is no such adjustment e⁄ect, i.e. B is constant and
equal to 1:
￿ if all investors share the same belief. The consensus belief ￿ M is then equal to that common
belief,
￿ if all the utility functions are logarithmic. This property makes the case of logarithmic
utility functions (which is often considered in the literature, see e.g. Rubinstein, 1976,
Detemple-Murthy, 1994, Zapatero, 1998) very speci￿c.
When B fails to be constant, it is a natural concern to determine whether it is greater
or smaller than 1, increasing or decreasing. This will allow us to analyze the nature of this
aggregation bias and its impact on the equilibrium state price density. For linear risk tolerance
utility functions, the processes ￿ M and B can be computed.






























(￿ ￿ 1)V ar￿ [￿]
where E￿ (resp. V ar￿) denote the expected value (resp. variance) of ￿ across agents with a
weight ￿i for agent i.
Notice that ￿M ￿ 0 if and only if ￿ ￿ 1 (this encompasses the exponential case).
For this class of utility functions, ￿
M is a risk tolerance weighted average of the individual ￿
i￿ s
and ￿M is proportional to the variance of the ￿
i￿ s with respect to the same weights. It appears
then that the equilibrium price corresponds to an equilibrium price in an equivalent economy
17where the individual beliefs are replaced by a risk tolerance-weighted average belief and where
an additional e⁄ect is introduced in order to take the initial heterogeneity into account. This
e⁄ect is measured by B or equivalently by ￿M which is directly related to beliefs dispersion.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that B is nondecreasing, greater than 1 (resp. nonincreasing,
lower than 1) if ￿ ￿ 1 (resp. ￿ ￿ 1): The technical reason for this result is the following.
Depending on whether ￿ < 1 or ￿ > 1, the function x￿ is convex or concave. Hence the
supermartingale result for ￿ < 1, the submartingale result for ￿ > 1 and the martingale result
for ￿ = 1. In most asset pricing models relative risk aversion is assumed to be larger than unity,
or ￿ < 1 in our notation, which leads to a positive discount rate
￿
￿￿M￿
and a decreasing B.
However, the parameter ￿ has also another interpretation as a cautiousness parameter. Indeed,
as shown by Gollier and Kimball (1996), the condition that absolute prudence is larger than twice
the absolute risk aversion, which is given by ￿ > 1 in our HARA setting17, characterizes agent￿ s
willingness to save when facing risky situations. When there is more risk involved, depending on
whether the investor is "cautious" or not, that is to say, depending on whether ￿ > 1 or ￿ < 1,
the investor reduces or increases current consumption with respect to future consumption. For
instance, for ￿ > 1, the investor is cautious and decreases current consumption acting as if
his/her utility was discounted by a negative discount rate. This seems then to be a desirable
property. Now in our context with heterogeneous beliefs, a possible interpretation consists in
considering the dispersion of beliefs as a source of risk. More risk tolerant agents will insure less
risk tolerant ones and will postpone their consumption. This is why at the collective level, the
discount rate will overweight the views of individuals that are more risk tolerant.
Conversely, the introduction of the stochastic discount factor B (at the individual level) in
a homogeneous beliefs setting induces shocks on the utility functions and leads the agents to
hedge these shocks. By doing this they mimic the behavior of the agents in the heterogeneous
beliefs economy. These shocks are then the counterpart of beliefs heterogeneity and this is why
17Unfortunately HARA type functions do not permit to distinguish risk aversion from elasticity of intertemporal




or negative would have hinged on the level of cautiousness, not on the level of risk aversion.
18the e⁄ect of beliefs heterogeneity might be compared to the e⁄ect of a new source of risk and
why the heterogeneous beliefs setting is fundamentally di⁄erent from the homogeneous beliefs
setting.
To summarize, we have pointed out through previous propositions two distinct e⁄ects of the
introduction of some beliefs heterogeneity on the equilibrium price .
There is ￿rst a change of probability e⁄ect from P to the new common probability Q; whose
density is given by ￿ M: This aggregate probability Q can be seen (at least for classical utility
functions) as a weighted average of the individual subjective probabilities. The weights of this
average are given by the individual risk tolerances exactly as in Rubinstein (1976) or Detemple-
Murthy (1994) where the authors focused on logarithmic utility functions.
The second e⁄ect is represented by an ￿aggregation bias￿which is of ￿nite variation and
takes the form of a discount factor. We are able, for linear risk tolerance utility functions, to
determine if it is associated to a positive or negative discount rate. Moreover, the adjustment
process can be seen (at least in classical cases) as a measure of dispersion of individual beliefs.
We shall now analyze the impact of these two features on the equilibrium properties.
3. Asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs
In this section, we use our construction of a representative consumer (Section 2) to study the
impact of heterogeneity of beliefs on asset pricing.




t) in the heterogeneous beliefs setting which we want to compare to the expression
obtained in the standard setting, which is given by qt = u0
￿ (t;e￿
t). We consider as the standard
setting an equilibrium under homogeneous beliefs (given by the objective probability P), for
which the representative agent utility function is given by u￿ with the same (￿i) as in our
heterogeneous beliefs setting18.
18This is in particular the case when the standard setting equilibrium has the same Lagrange multipliers (or
equivalently the same marginal valuations) as in our framework, or when investors have linear risk tolerance
utility functions, since in that case (see e.g. Huang-Litzenberger, 1988), the representative agent utility function
193.1. Adjusted CCAPM, Market Price of Risk and Risk-free Rate
We suppose the existence of a riskless asset with price process S0 such that dS0
t = rf(t)S0
t dt
and of a risky asset with price process19
dSt = St￿R (t)dt + St￿R (t)dWt ￿R > 0:








and the risk-free rate in the heterogeneous beliefs setting.
Proposition 5. The market price of risk (or Sharpe ratio) and the risk-free rate with hetero-
geneous beliefs are given by








t = MPRt [standard] ￿ ￿
M
t (3.1)

















































t [homogeneous under Q] ￿ ￿M
t : (3.5)
Equation (3:1) is the CCAPM formula with heterogeneous beliefs. This adjusted formula
di⁄ers from the classical one only through the change of probability from P to the consensus
probability Q and the MPR in the heterogeneous beliefs setting is given by the MPR in an
economy where all investors would share the same belief Q: The adjustment process B plays no
does not depend upon the individual Lagrange multipliers (or initial allocations).
19We assume that the coe¢ cients of these stochastic di⁄erential represenations satisfy the same conditions as
in footnote 14.
20role.
Beliefs heterogeneity increases the market price of risk if and only if ￿
M ￿ 0: A non-
positive (resp. nonnegative) ￿
M corresponds to a pessimistic (resp. optimistic) consensus
probability. Indeed, letting W
Q




s ds; we know by Girsanov￿ s Theorem that
W
Q












t ; hence a nonpositive ￿
M decreases the instantaneous aggre-
gate wealth growth rate. Notice that a pessimistic consensus probability will also systematically
decrease the instantaneous rate of return of any asset that is positively correlated with aggre-
gate wealth. We have then obtained that optimism (resp. pessimism) at the consensus level
decreases (resp. increases) the MPR. In fact, the MPR subjectively expected is not modi￿ed
by the introduction of some beliefs dispersion or of some pessimism. In other words, the reason
why pessimism increases the objective expectation of the MPR is not that pessimistic consumers
require a higher risk premium. A pessimistic representative agent requires the same MPR but
his/her pessimism leads him/her to underestimate the average rate of return of equity (leav-
ing unchanged his/her estimation of the risk-free rate). Thus the objective expectation of the
MPR is greater than the representative agent￿ s subjective expectation, hence is greater than the
standard MPR.
These results are consistent with those of Abel (2002), Cechetti et al. (2000), Epstein and
Wang (1994), Hansen et al. (1999), or Anderson et al. (2000), which introduce distorded beliefs
associated to cautious/pessimistic individual behavior. Since we have obtained that the MPR
in the heterogeneous beliefs setting is in fact given by the MPR under the homogeneous belief
Q, we are actually led to face the same issue as in e.g. Abel (2002), where investors all have the
same subjective probability, di⁄erent from the initial objective one20.
Unlike in Abel￿ s paper setting, there is no need, in our setting, for all investors to be pes-
simistic. Pessimism at the aggregate level is su¢ cient in order to ensure an increase in the market
20Abel (2002) shows in a discrete time setting, and for power utility functions, that ￿uniform pessimism￿
(de￿ned as a leftward translation of the objective distribution of the aggregate consumption) on the agents￿
(common) subjective probability leads to a higher risk premium.
21price of risk. More precisely, in the case of linear risk tolerance utility functions, there is no need
for all ￿






nonpositive. We shall in Section 4 explore conditions on the individual beliefs under which the
consensus probability is pessimistic (resp. optimistic).
By contrast with the MPR, both the change of probability e⁄ect and the discount factor
have an impact on the risk-free rate. The impact of the discount factor is represented by
￿M: If B is nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing), then ￿M is nonnegative (resp. nonpositive)




as a discount rate, a nonpositive ￿M means that future
consumption is less important for the representative agent, and leads to a higher equilibrium
interest rate. We have seen that for power utility functions with ￿ < 1 (which is the reasonable
case), as well as for exponential utility functions, ￿M is nonpositive, so that the e⁄ect of the
aggregation bias is towards an increase of the interest rate which is bad news in light of the




and as underlined by Weil (1989), ￿a value of ￿ above 1 (which corresponds in our
setting to a nonpositive discount rate) is a computer￿ s solution of the risk-free rate puzzle￿ 22.
The impact of the change of probability from P to the consensus probability Q is represented













and contributes to a lowering of the risk-free rate if and
only if Q is pessimistic, i.e. ￿
M ￿ 0. The interpretation is the following: if consumers are
pessimistic about the growth rate of aggregate wealth, then relative to the standard case, they
will attempt to reduce current consumption and increase current savings. The attempt to
increase current savings puts downward pressure on the interest rate.
Combining both e⁄ects, we obtain that the impact of heterogeneity of investors￿beliefs is
towards a lower (resp. higher) risk-free rate if the aggregate probability is pessimistic (resp.
optimistic) and B is nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing). The e⁄ect may remain, for instance,
21As underlined above this case is consistent with the interpretation of ￿ as a cautiousness parameter.
22In his setting, a value of ￿ above 1 corresponds to an exogeneous negative discount of future consumption
and does not correspond to a natural behavior. In our setting, the possibly negative discount rate results
endogeneously from beliefs heterogeneity.




is ￿small￿which is associated in classical examples to a small dispersion of beliefs.
3.2. Asset price
Adopting the same approach as in the standard setting, we easily obtain that for a risky asset










t = MtBtu0 (t;e￿






























As in the risk-free rate analysis, both e⁄ects of the change of probability and the discount factor
are to be noticed.
If B is nonincreasing which is the case for linear risk tolerance utility functions when ￿ ￿ 1,














which means that the asset price under heterogeneous beliefs is lower than the asset price in a
model where all investors share the same probability Q. The converse e⁄ect occurs for general
power utility functions with ￿ ￿ 1. The interpretation here again is clear since B represents a
discount factor.
















. The e⁄ect is towards a







s], which again is related to
the pessimism/optimism of the consensus belief Q. Indeed, consider the case of power utility
functions, u0 (t;x) = (￿x)













, and it is easy to see (See the Appendix, Proof of Inequality
(3:6)) that if the consensus probability is pessimistic, i.e. if ￿

















The same result holds for an optimistic consensus probability and ￿ ￿ 1: For ￿
M ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ 1
(resp. for ￿

















We shall focus in this section on the case of linear risk tolerance utility functions, and in order
to disentangle wealth e⁄ect and pure risk aversion e⁄ect, we will analyze separately the case of
exponential utility functions and the case of power utility functions.
4.1. Exponential utility functions and the risk aversion e⁄ect
In the case of exponential utility functions, the parameters involved in the expressions of M; ￿M
and ￿
M do not depend upon the individual characteristics (prices and individual allocations).
24Indeed, we have23, for utility functions of the form u0


















































The aggregate characteristic M (resp. the aggregate di⁄usion coe¢ cient ￿
M) overweights
the individual beliefs Mi (resp. the di⁄usion coe¢ cients ￿
i) for which ￿i is greater than the
average and underweights the beliefs Mi (resp. the individual di⁄usion coe¢ cients ￿
i) for which
￿i is smaller than the average.










i and the impact on the risk
premium is simply given by the pessimism/optimism of the ￿equally-weighted average￿investor.
If investors are on average optimistic (resp. pessimistic), then the risk premium is lower (resp.
higher) than in the standard setting24. Furthermore, the impact of beliefs heterogeneity on the
interest rate is towards a raising of the interest rate.










where Ea and cova denote the agents equally-weighted expectation and
covariance. The ￿rst e⁄ect on the di⁄usion coe¢ cient ￿
M (hence on the risk premium) is





e⁄ect is given by the covariance between risk tolerance/aversion and optimism/pessimism. If,
for instance, we assume that the more risk tolerant investors are pessimistic and the less risk
tolerant investors are optimistic, then we get a higher market price of risk and a lower interest
rate (as soon as the dispersion remains moderate). It remains to analyze the validity of such a
23For a given equilibrium characteristic x (risk premium, market price of risk, risk free rate, etc.) ￿(x) stands
for the di⁄erence between the value of x in the heterogeneous beliefs setting and in the standard setting.






i=1 ￿i = 0;
then we get that the market price of risk remains unchanged with respect to the homogeneous setting.
25negative/positive correlation. This could be done through behavioral or psychological empirical
studies, and to our knowledge, this question is still open. This could also be done through the
introduction in our model of a speci￿c learning process which would lead to such a correlation,
and this is left for future research25.
4.2. Power utility functions and initial wealth e⁄ect
We have seen that in the case of power utility functions of the form u0























































Let us analyze these formulas in the speci￿c framework of two agents, with constant di⁄usion
coe¢ cients ￿
i. The weights in these formulas are still proportional to the individual risk toler-
ances or to (￿i)
￿￿ ￿
Mi￿￿
. However these risk tolerances depend on the individual equilibrium
allocations and are time and state dependent. In the next, we shall try to provide a simple way
to estimate the impact on the market price of risk.







denotes investor i0s initial wealth and the consensus belief is a wealth-
weighted average of the individual beliefs (see Rubinstein, 1976). We prove in the next that this
last result remains true, in an approximate way, for power utility functions.





is approximately equal to w1
w2. More precisely,












25Once again, notice that the introduction of such a learning process is consistent with our framework.
26where " is given by
j￿1￿￿2j
2 and where k1 and k2 are positive constants.
This means that for a small dispersion of beliefs (i.e. for small "), the aggregate charac-













. The consensus characteristic re￿ ects then the opti-
mism/pessimism of the wealthier agent. Note that in the case of two agents with the same initial
wealth, we prove (see the Appendix) that there is a bias towards optimism (resp. pessimism)







As a direct consequence of Lemma 4:1; we obtain numerically that for a large range of possible
values for ￿ (namely ￿ 2 ]0:1;1:1[), for " (" 2 ]0;0:33[) and for w1
w2 (w1
w2 2 ]1;9[), the aggregate
characteristic is approximated by the wealth-weighted average of the individual beliefs with a
reasonable precision. The relative error made is mostly around 1% and always lower than 5%.
As far as the risk premium is concerned, we have seen, in Section 3, that the impact of the
heterogeneity of beliefs is measured by ￿R￿
M, where ￿R denotes the volatility of the asset under
consideration: We prove that the expected value of the consensus belief di⁄usion coe¢ cient ￿
M is
approximately given by the wealth-weighted average of the individual belief di⁄usion coe¢ cients
￿
i: The following Lemma gives an upper bound for the error made by this approximation in the




= 0;￿1 = ￿￿2 = ". A similar approximation
can be obtained in the general case.
Lemma 4.2. If ￿1 = ￿￿2 = " 2 R￿
+, then for some positive constants k3; k4; k5; and k6 we have














￿ ￿2"3k3+k4"(expk1"￿ ￿ 1):
For the same range of possible values for ￿; " and w1
w2 as above the maximum approximation
error is around 0.01. The wealth-weighted average of the individual beliefs di⁄usion coe¢ cients
is then a good approximation of the expected value of the aggregate belief di⁄usion coe¢ cient.
This permits a simple analysis of the impact of the introduction of beliefs heterogeneity on the
27risk premium.
The consensus belief di⁄usion coe¢ cient re￿ ects the optimism/pessimism of the ￿wealthier￿
agent. If wealth is positively correlated with optimism we obtain a lower expected risk premium
for assets with high beliefs dispersion26. Prices will re￿ ect the optimistic view, even though short
sale constraints are not part of our model. This result is consistent with the empirical study
of Diether et al. (2002), who ￿provide evidence that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts
earnings forecasts earn lower future returns than otherwise similar stocks￿ .
For example, let us suppose that the volatility ￿ of aggregate wealth e￿ is equal to 5%, and
that its drift ￿ is equal to 3%, and let us assume that the optimists (resp. pessimists) belief
for the drift ￿1(resp. ￿2) is equal to 5% (resp. 1%)27. Let us also suppose that the optimists
wealth is three times larger than the pessimists one. The risk premium is then 3% lower than
in the standard setting for an asset whose volatility is equal to 15%28:
Notice that a negative correlation between optimism and wealth would lead to a more pes-
simistic consensus belief and would raise the risk premium.
If we now introduce some bias in the investors beliefs, and suppose as in e.g. Abel (2000)




< 0), then we obtain that






remains negative if the dispersion of beliefs is small. As above, the risk premium is lower for
stocks with higher beliefs dispersion. But in this situation, the risk premium is higher and the
26For the sake of simplicity we only considered one source of risk. However, all results can be easily generalized









t ; ￿ > 0























t ; M0 = 1










27This corresponds to a nonsystematic bias situation (￿ = 0) with ￿ =
￿1￿￿2
2￿ = 0:4:







28risk-free rate lower than in the standard setting, which is interesting in light of the risk premium
and risk-free rate puzzles.
In order to "calibrate" the model with market data, let us assume that ￿ = 3:6%; ￿ = 1:8%
and ￿R = 16:8%: These numbers correspond to the observed volatility and drift for the US
consumption during the last century and to the market portfolio volatility during the same
period. In Table 1, we provide for these speci￿cations and for di⁄erent values of the wealth
distribution parameter w1
w1+w2, of the cautiousness parameter ￿, of the average belief ￿ and of
belief dispersion ", the equilibrium risk premium and risk-free rate. If ￿ ￿ = " = 0, there is
no belief heterogeneity and the common belief corresponds to the true probability (rational
expectations). In that case, the estimated risk premium is too low. When ￿ decreases, it is
possible to obtain higher values for the risk premium; however the risk-free rate becomes too
high. These observations correspond to the classical risk premium and risk-free rate puzzles (see
Kocherlakota, 1996, for a survey on these "puzzles").
If we introduce some pessimism (￿ ￿ < 0) without belief dispersion, we obtain higher risk
premia and lower risk-free rates: the introduction of some pessimism might be a possible partial
explanation of the puzzles (see e.g. Abel (2002)).
Finally, if we introduce some pessimism (￿ ￿ < 0) as well as some belief dispersion, we can
obtain risk premium and risk-free rate levels that are compatible with historical data for both
cases, ￿ < 1 and ￿ ￿ 1. Furthermore, for ￿ < 1; higher belief dispersion leads to a lower risk
premium as in Diether et al.(2002).
5. Concluding and additional remarks
In this paper, we provide an aggregation procedure which allows us to analyze a market equilib-
rium model with heterogeneous beliefs, to rewrite in a simple way the equilibrium characteristics
(market price of risk, risk premium, risk-free rate) in a heterogeneous beliefs framework and to
compare them with an otherwise similar standard setting. The impact of belief heterogeneity
on market price of risk is characterized by the risk tolerance weighted average belief. For power
29utility functions, this average can be approximated by the wealth weighted average belief. Fur-
thermore, there is a way to parameterize the heterogeneous beliefs model in order to obtain
globally higher risk premia and lower risk-free rates.
Our aggregation procedure enables us to retrieve in a simple and intuitive way well known
results of the ￿nancial literature on portfolio constraints. For instance, let us consider a model
where investors share common beliefs but are submitted to possible short-sale constraints. In-
tuitively, the equilibrium prices and allocations in such a model are the same as in a model
without short-sale constraint but with heterogeneous beliefs. It su¢ ces to replace the beliefs of
the investors for which the short-sale constraint (in the initial model) is binding by well chosen
more optimistic beliefs and to leave others beliefs unchanged. The consensus consumer is then
optimistic and the impact on the MPR and risk-free rate follows: the short sales constraints lead
to a lower market price of risk and to a higher risk-free rate. The case of borrowing constraints
can be analyzed similarly and leads to opposite results. In Basak and Cuoco (1998), the authors
consider a two-agent equilibrium model with restricted market participation. The ￿rst agent
does not have access to the risky asset market and the second one is not restricted. Without
market restrictions, the ￿rst agent would buy shares of the risky asset. It is then easy to see
that the equilibrium prices and allocations in such a model are the same as in a model without
market restrictions, where the ￿rst agent￿ s belief is replaced by a well-chosen, more pessimistic
one. The aggregate probability is then pessimistic, which leads to a higher risk premium and a
lower risk-free rate.
30Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Since q￿ is an interior equilibrium price process relative to the beliefs
￿
Mi￿
; and the income processes e￿
i




= e￿ and that there exist positive





















Since all utility functions are increasing and strictly concave and take values in R[f￿1g, for


















is independent from i. We denote this
process by p(￿): Letting M(￿) ￿
q
￿























+ yi. The process M is adapted and
positive. Moreover, at date t = 0; we have for all i, Mi









that M0 = 1.
As far as uniqueness is concerned, notice that any process yi such that
PN















for some positive process M is a solution of the maximization problem
￿
P￿￿
, which, as seen
above, admits a unique solution.
Proof of Proposition 2. Similar to the proof of the analogous result in a standard setting.
31Proof of Example 2.1 Since the representative utility function u￿ is given by







the expression of u￿ in the speci￿c setting of linear risk tolerance utility functions is obtained,
as in the standard case (see e.g. Huang-Litzenberger, 1988), by using 1
￿iu0
i(t;xi) = u0(t;x) with
PN
i=1 xi = x:






















￿ yi = e￿:



































































































Proof of Proposition 3. We know by Proposition 2 that there exists a consensus consumer
with consensus characteristic M and utility function u such that Mtu0 (t;e￿
t) = q￿
t. Since dMt =
Mt
h
￿M (t)dt + ￿
M (t)dWt
i





















hence with the notations of the Proposition, Mt = BtMt:






























































































i (t;x) = ￿i + ￿x for ￿ 6= 0; the result is obtained in the same way, by applying It￿￿ s







33Proof of Proposition 5. Since q￿ is a state price density, the price process S must be such
that q￿S is a P-martingale so that as in the classical case (see, e.g. Du¢ e, 1996, or Huang-
Litzenberger, 1988) we have ￿R ￿rf = ￿￿q￿￿R and rf = ￿￿q￿. Now, since q￿
t = Mtu0(t;e￿
t) we
easily get, through It￿￿ s Lemma,












t [heterogeneous] = r
f














Proof of Inequality 3.6 Since de￿
t = e￿






















t ￿ Wt ￿
R t
0 ￿































M ￿ 0, and ￿ ￿ 1, then exp(1 ￿ 1=￿)
R s
t ￿u￿

























































































M ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ 1 (resp. ￿
M ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ 1; ￿
M ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ 1).



































































































































































































































































with a = 1
2
h











































































































"￿ ("￿ ￿ ￿)
o￿
: The other inequality is obtained






Proof of the following result: If ￿1 = ￿￿2 = " 2 R￿
+, if (￿t;￿t) 2 R2, and if the investors
are endowed with the same initial wealth, then
￿1 < ￿2, for ￿ < 1; ￿1 > ￿2; for ￿ > 1; ￿1 = ￿2; for ￿ = 1





















It is immediate that A can be written in the form A = 1































For ￿ < 1, we show that ￿1 ￿ ￿2. We prove 1) that g (1) ￿ 0; and 2) that g is increasing with
x, which implies that for ￿1 > ￿2 we would have A < 0; which is impossible. We have




















































With deterministic coe¢ cients,
￿
M1￿￿
















































































= 0; we obtain that g (1) ￿ 0.








































































































































exp(2￿￿x) + exp(￿2￿￿x) ￿ 2



























































































￿: The rest of the proof comes from Lemma 4:1:
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In this table, for ￿ = 3:6%; ￿ = 1:8% and ￿R = 16:8%; we report the values of the risk premium
and of the risk-free rate for di⁄erent values of the cautiousness parameter ￿, the average belief ￿ ￿; the
wealth distribution w1
w1+w2 and the belief dispersion ".
(RP%;r%) ￿ ￿ = 0 ￿ ￿ = ￿0:25
￿ w1
w1+w2 " = 0 " = 0:10 " = 0 " = 0:10 " = 0:20 " = 0:30
0:5 0:5 (2:1;3:2) (2:1;3:5) (6:3;1:4) (6:3;1:6) (6:3;2:4) (6:3;2:8)
0:9 (2:1;3:2) (0:8;3:9) (6:3;1:4) (5:0;2:1) (3:6;2:9) (2:3;4:0)
0:1 (2:1;3:2) (3:4;2:7) (6:3;1:4) (7:6;0:9) (9:0;0:6) (10:3;0:5)
0:9 0:5 (1:2;1:8) (1:2;1:9) (5:4;0:8) (5:4;0:9) (5:4;1:0) (5:4;1:3)
0:9 (1:2;1:8) (￿1:2;2:1) (5:4;0:8) (4:1;1:1) (2:7;1:5) (1:4;1:9)
0:1 (1:2;1:8) (2:5;1:5) (5:4;0:8) (6:7;0:5) (8;1;0;2) (9:4;0:0)
1:1 0:5 (0:9;1:5) (0:9;1:5) (5:1;0:7) (5:1;0:6) (5:1;0:5) (5:1;0:2)
0:9 (0:9;1:5) (￿0:4;1:7) (5:1;0:7) (3:8;0:9) (2:4;1:1) (1:1;1:3)
0:1 (0:9;1:5) (2:2;1;2) (5:1;0:7) (6:4;0:4) (7:8;0:1) (9:1;￿0:3)
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